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Abstract. As a convention, p-value is often computed in frequentist hypothesis testing and
compared with the nominal significance level of 0.05 to determine whether or not to reject
the null hypothesis. The smaller the p-value, the more significant the statistical test. We
consider both one-sided and two-sided hypotheses in the composite hypothesis setting. For
one-sided hypothesis tests, we establish the equivalence of p-value and the Bayesian posterior
probability of the null hypothesis, which renders p-value an explicit interpretation of how
strong the data support the null. For two-sided hypothesis tests of a point null, we recast
the problem as a combination of two one-sided hypotheses alone the opposite directions and
put forward the notion of a two-sided posterior probability, which also has an equivalent
relationship with the (two-sided) p-value. Extensive simulation studies are conducted to
demonstrate the Bayesian posterior probability interpretation for the p-value. Contrary to
common criticisms of the use of p-value in evidence-based studies, we justify its utility and
reclaim its importance from the Bayesian perspective, and recommend the continual use of
p-value in hypothesis testing. After all, p-value is not all that bad.
KEYWORDS: Bayesian analysis, Clinical trial, Hypothesis testing, One-sided test, Posterior
probability, Two-sided test
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1 Introduction
Hypothesis testing is ubiquitous in modern statistical applications, which permeates many
different fields such as biology, medicine, phycology, economics, and engineering etc. As a
critical component of the hypothesis testing procedure (Lehmann and Romano, 2005), p-
value is defined as the probability of observing the random data as or more extreme than the
observed given the null hypothesis being true. In general, the statistical significance level or
the type I error rate is set at 5%, so that a p-value below 5% is considered significant leading
to rejection of the null hypothesis, and that above 5% insignificant resulting in failure to
reject the null.
Although p-value is the most commonly used summary measure for evidence or strength
in the data regarding the null hypothesis, it has been the center of controversies and debates
for decades. To clarify ambiguities surrounding p-value, the American Statistical Association
(2016) gave statements on p-value and, in particular, the second point states that “P -values
do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability that
the data were produced by random chance alone.” It is often argued that p-value only
gives information on how incompatible the data are with the null hypothesis, but it does not
provide any information on how likely the data would occur under the alternative hypothesis.
Extensive investigations have been conducted on the inadequacy of the p-value. Rosen-
thal and Rubin (1983) studied how p-value can be adjusted to allow for greater power when
an order of importance exists on the hypothesis tests. Royall (1986) investigated the effect of
sample size on p-value. Schervish (1996) described computation of the p-value for one-sided
point null hypotheses, and also discussed the intermediate interval hypothesis. Hung et al.
(1997) studied the behavior of p-value under the alternative hypothesis, which depends on
both the true value of the tested parameter and sample size. Rubin (1998) proposed an alter-
native randomization-based p-value for double-blind trials with non-compliance. Sackrowitz
and Samuel-Cahn (1999) promoted more widespread use of the expected p-value in practice.
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Donahue (1999) suggested that the distribution of the p-value under the alternative hypoth-
esis provide more information for rejection of implausible alternative hypotheses. As there is
a widespread notion that medical research is interpreted mainly based on p-value, Ioannidis
(2005) claimed that most of the published findings are false. Hubbard and Lindsay (2008)
showed that p-value tends to exaggerate the evidence against the null hypothesis. Simmons
et al. (2011) demonstrated that p-value is subject to manipulation to achieve the threshold
of 0.05 and cautioned against its use. Nuzzo (2014) gave an editorial on why p-value alone
cannot serve as adequate statistical evidence for inference.
Criticisms on p-value and null hypothesis significance testing have become even more
contentious in recent years. If the key words “misuse of p-value” or “ban p-value” are used
in Google search, millions of queries can be found to attack and bash p-value. More seriously,
several journals, e.g., Basic and Applied Social Psychology and Political Analysis, have made
claims to ban the use of p-value in their publications (Trafimow and Marks, 2015; Gill, 2018).
The controversy over p-value has recently been reignited, which is more centered around the
proposals to adjust, abandon or provide alternatives to p-value. Fidler et al. (2004) and
Ranstam (2012) recommended use of the confidence interval as an alternative to p-value,
and Cumming (2014) called for abandoning p-value in favor of reporting the confidence
interval. Colquhoun (2014) investigated the issue of misinterpretation of p-value as a culprit
for the high false discovery rate. Concato and Hartigan (2016) suggested that p-value should
not be the primary focus of attention or the sole basis for evaluation of scientific results.
McShane et al. (2017) recommended that the role of p-value as a threshold for screening
scientific findings should be demoted, and that p-value should not take priority over other
statistical measures. In the aspect of reproducibility concerns of scientific research, Johnson
(2013) traced one major cause of nonreproducibility as the routine use of the null hypothesis
testing procedure. Leek et al. (2017) proposed abandonment of p-value thresholding and
transparent reporting of false positive risk as remedies to the replicability issue in science.
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Benjamin et al. (2018) recommended shifting the significance threshold from 0.05 to 0.005,
while Trafimow et al. (2018) argued that such a shift is futile and unacceptable.
Bayesian approaches are often advocated as a solution to the crisis resulting from abusing
the p-value. Goodman (1999) strongly supported use of the Bayes factor in contrast to p-
value as a measure of evidence for medical evidence-based research. Rubin (1984) proposed
the predictive p-value as the tail-area probability of the posterior predictive distribution, and
Meng (1994) further studied its properties. In the applications to psychology, Wagenmakers
(2007) revealed the issues with p-value and recommended use of the Bayesian information
criterion instead. In an effort to support the wider use of Bayesian statistics, Lee (2010)
demonstrated that Bayesian approaches provide a superior alternative to the frequentist
methods using p-values. Alongside its ban on p-value, the journal of Basic and Applied Social
Psychology gave endorsement of Bayesian approaches (Trafimow and Marks, 2015). Briggs
(2017) proposed that p-value should be proscribed and be substituted with the Bayesian
posterior probability, while Savalei and Dunn (2015) expressed skepticism on the utility of
abandoning p-value and resorting to alternative hypothesis testing paradigms, such as the
Bayesian approach, in solving the reproducibility issue.
On the other hand, extensive research has been conducted in an attempt to reconcile or
account for the differences between frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing approaches
(Berger, 2003; and Bayarri and Berger, 2004). For hypothesis testing, Berger and Sellke
(1987), Berger and Delampady (1987), and Casella and Berger (1987) investigated the rela-
tionships between p-value and the Bayesian measure of evidence against the null hypothesis.
In particular, they provided an in-depth study of one-sided hypothesis testing and point
null cases, and also discussed the posterior probability of the null hypothesis with respect
to various prior distributions including the mixture prior distribution with a point mass at
the null and the other more broad distribution over the alternative (Lindley, 1957). Sellke,
Bayarri, and Berger (2001) proposed to calibrate p-value for testing precise null hypotheses.
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Although p-value is often regarded as an inadequate and insufficient representation of
statistical evidence, it did not stall the scientific advancement in the past years. Jager and
Leek (2014) surveyed high-profile medical journals and estimated the rate of false discover-
ies in the medical literature using reported p-values as the data, which led to a conclusion
that the medical literature remains a reliable record of scientific progress. Murtaugh (2014)
defended the use of p-value based on the ground that it is closely linked to the confidence in-
terval and to the difference in Akaike’s information criterion. Despite the fact that Bayesian
alternatives are often recommended as superior solutions to the various notorious drawbacks
of p-value, in many common cases, p-value in fact has a simple and clear Bayesian interpre-
tation. We present the relationship between the frequentist p-value and Bayesian posterior
probability in several commonly encountered settings in clinical trials, and show that in both
one-sided and two-sided hypothesis tests, asymptotic equivalence, sometimes exact equiva-
lence, can be established. Although in terms of definition, p-value is not the probability that
the null hypothesis is true, contrary to the conventional notion, it does have a close corre-
spondence to the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis being true. Based
on the theoretical results of Dudley and Haughton (2002), we present several cases where
p-value and the posterior probability of the null are equivalent for one-sided tests. Further,
we extend such equivalence results to two-sided hypothesis testing problems, where most of
the controversies and discrepancies lie. In particular, we introduce the notion of two-sided
posterior probability which matches the p-value from a two-sided hypothesis test. After all,
we conclude that p-value is not all that bad.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a motivating
example that shows the similarity in operating characteristics of a frequentist hypothesis
test and a Bayesian counterpart using the posterior probability. In Section 3, we show that
p-value and the posterior probability have an equivalence relationship for the case of binary
outcomes. In Section 4, we present such equivalence properties for univariate normal data
5
with known and unknown variances respectively, and in Section 5, we develop similar results
for hypothesis tests involving multivariate data. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some
remarks.
2 Motivating Example
The use of binary endpoint is common in clinical trial design. Frequentist design typically
utilizes an exact binomial test or Z-test based on normal approximation, and Bayesian design
often bases the decision on the posterior probabilities. As a motivating example, we consider
a two-arm clinical trial comparing the response rate of an experimental drug pE versus that
of the standard drug pS. We are interested in testing a one-sided hypothesis,
H0: pE ≤ pS versus H1: pE > pS. (2.1)
When there is sufficient evidence to support H1, we would reject H0 and claim that the
experimental treatment is superior.
Under the frequentist approach, we construct a Z-test statistic,
Z =
pˆE − pˆS
[{pˆE(1− pˆE) + pˆS(1− pˆS)}/n]1/2
, (2.2)
where n is the sample size per arm, pˆE = yE/n and pˆS = yS/n are the sample proportions, yE
and yS are the numbers of responders in the respective arms. We reject the null hypothesis
if Z > zα, where zα is the 100(1− α)th percentile of the standard normal distribution.
Under the Bayesian framework, we assume beta prior distributions for pE and pS, i.e.,
pE ∼ Beta(aE , bE) and pS ∼ Beta(aS, bS). The binomial likelihood function for group g can
be formulated as
P (yg|pg) =
(
n
yg
)
pygg (1− pg)
n−yg , g = E, S.
The posterior distribution of pg is given by
pg|yg ∼ Beta(ag + yg, bg + n− yg),
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for which the density function is denoted by f(pg|yg). Let η be a prespecified cutoff proba-
bility boundary. We declare treatment superiority if the posterior probability of pE greater
than pS exceeds threshold η. Based on the posterior probability, we can construct a Bayesian
decision rule so that the experimental treatment is declared as superior if
Pr(H1|yE, yS) = Pr(pE > pS|yE, yS) > η, (2.3)
where
Pr(pE > pS|yE, yS) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
pS
f(pE|yE)f(pS|yS)dpEdpS.
Otherwise, we fail to declare treatment superiority, i.e., fail to reject the null hypothesis.
To maintain the frequentist type I error rate at α, we need to set η = 1 − α. The
exact probabilities of committing type I and type II errors under the frequentist design are
respectively given by
α =
n∑
yE=0
n∑
yS=0
P (yE|pE = pS)P (yS|pS)I(Z > zα),
and
β =
n∑
yE=0
n∑
yS=0
P (yE|pE = pS + δ)P (yS|pS)I(Z < zα),
where δ is the desired treatment difference and I(·) is the indicator function. The exact
error rates under the Bayesian test can be derived similarly by replacing Z > zα with
Pr(pE > pS|yE, yS) > 1− α inside the indicator function.
As a numerical study, we consider a two-arm randomized trial with a type I error
rate of 10% and 5% and target power of 80% and 90% when (pS, pE) = (0.2, 0.3) and
(pS, pE) = (0.2, 0.35), respectively. Under equal randomization, to achieve the desired power,
the required sample size per arm is
n =
(zα + zβ)
2
δ2
{pE(1− pE) + pS(1− pS)},
where we take δ = 0.1 and 0.15. Under the Bayesian design, we assume non-informative prior
distributions, pS ∼ Beta(0.2, 0.8) and pE ∼ Beta(0.2, 0.8). For comparison, we compute the
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type I error rate and power for both the Bayesian test with η = 1−α and the frequentist Z-
test with a critical value z1−α. As shown in Figure 1, both designs produce similar operating
characteristics: the type I error rate can be maintained at the nominal level, and the power
attains the target level of 80% or 90% at the specified values of (pS, pE). It is worth noting
that because the endpoints are binary and the trial outcomes are discrete, exact calibration
of the empirical type I error rate to the nominal level is not possible, particularly when the
sample size is small. When we adopt a larger sample size by setting the type I error rate
to be 5% and the target power to be 90%, the empirical type I error rate is closer to the
nominal level as shown in the blue lines.
3 Hypothesis Test for Binary Data
3.1 Two-Sample Hypothesis Test
We first study the relationship between p-value and the posterior probability in a two-arm
randomized clinical trial with dichotomous outcomes. We consider the one-sided hypothesis
test in (2.1), and under the frequentist Z-test for two proportions given by (2.2), the p-value
is
p-value1 = 1− Φ(Z),
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal dis-
tribution. At the significance level of α, we reject the null hypothesis if p-value is smaller
than α.
In the Bayesian paradigm, we base our decision on the posterior probability, as given in
(2.3). We reject the null hypothesis if the posterior probability of pE ≤ pS is smaller than α,
PoP1 = Pr(pE ≤ pS|yE, yS) < α.
As a numerical study, we set n = 20, 50, 100 and 500, and randomly draw integers
between 0 and n to be the values for yE and yS, and for each replication we compute the
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posterior probability of the null hypothesis Pr(H0|yE, yS) and the p-value. As shown in
Figure 2, all the paired values lie very close to the straight line of y = x, indicating the
equivalence between the p-value and posterior probability of the null.
Figure 3 shows the differences between p-values and posterior probabilities Pr(pE ≤
pS|yE, yS) under sample sizes of 20, 50, 100 and 500, respectively. As sample size increases,
the differences diminish toward 0, corroborating the asymptotic equivalence between p-value
and the posterior probability.
For two-sided hypothesis tests, we are interested in examining whether there is any
difference in the treatment effect between the experimental drug and the standard drug,
H0: pE = pS versus H1: pE 6= pS.
The p-value under the two-sided hypothesis test is
p-value2 = 2− 2Φ(|Z|) = 2[1−max{Φ(Z),Φ(−Z)}].
It is worth emphasizing that under the frequentist paradigm, the two-sided test can be
viewed as a combination of two one-sided tests along the opposite directions. Therefore,
to construct an equivalent counterpart under the Bayesian paradigm, we may regard the
problem as two opposite one-sided Bayesian test and compute the posterior probabilities of
the two opposite hypotheses; this approach to Bayesian hypothesis testing is different from
the one commonly adopted in the literature, where a prior probability mass is imposed on
the point null, e.g., see Berger and Sellke (1987), Berger and Delampady (1987), and Berger
(2003).
If we define the two-sided posterior probability (PoP2) as
PoP2 = 2[1−max{Pr(pE > pS|yE, yS),Pr(pE < pS|yE, yS)}],
then its relationship with p-value is similar to that of one-sided hypothesis testing as shown
in Figure 4.
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The equivalence of the p-value and the posterior probability in the case of binary outcomes
can be established by applying the Bayesian central limit theorem. Under large sample size,
the posterior distribution of pE and pS can be approximated as
pg|yg ∼ N(pˆg, pˆg(1− pˆg)/n), g = E, S.
As yE and yS are independent, the posterior distribution of pE − pS can be derived as
pE − pS|yE, yS ∼ N(pˆE − pˆS, {pˆE(1− pˆE) + pˆS(1− pˆS)}/n).
Therefore, the posterior probability of pE ≤ pS is
PoP1 = Pr(pE ≤ pS|yE, yS) ≈ Φ
(
−
pˆE − pˆS
[{pˆE(1− pˆE) + pˆS(1− pˆS)}/n]1/2
)
= Φ(−Z),
which is equivalent to p-value1 = 1 − Φ(Z) = Φ(−Z). The equivalence relationship for a
two-sided test can be derived along similar lines.
More generally, Dudley and Haughton (2002) proved that under mild regularity con-
ditions, the posterior probability of a half space converges to the standard normal CDF
transformation of the likelihood ratio test statistic. In a one-sided hypothesis test, the pos-
terior probability of the half space is Pr(H1|D) = 1 − PoP1, whereas the standard normal
CDF transformation of the likelihood ratio test statistic equals to one minus p-value1, an
therefore PoP1 and p-value1 are asymptotically equivalent.
3.2 One-Sample Hypothesis Test
In a single-arm clinical trial with dichotomous outcomes, we are interested in examining
whether the response rate of the experimental drug pE exceeds a prespecified threshold p0,
by formulating a one-sided hypothesis test,
H0: pE ≤ p0 versus H1: pE > p0.
In the frequentist paradigm, the p-value can be computed based on the exact binomial
test. In the Bayesian paradigm, we assume a beta prior distribution for pE , e.g., pE ∼
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Beta(aE , bE). The posterior distribution of pE is given by pE|yE ∼ Beta(aE+yE, bE+n−yE),
for which the density function is denoted by f(pE|yE). Based on the posterior probability,
we can construct a Bayesian decision rule so that the experimental treatment is declared as
promising if
Pr(H1|yE) = Pr(pE > p0|yE) > η,
where
Pr(pE > p0|yE) =
∫ 1
p0
f(pE|yE)dpE.
Otherwise, we fail to declare treatment efficacy. As a result, the one-sided posterior proba-
bility is defined as
PoP1 = Pr(H0|yE) = Pr(pE ≤ p0|yE).
For two-sided hypothesis tests, we are interested in examining whether the response rate
of the experimental drug is different from p0,
H0: pE = p0 versus H1: pE 6= p0.
The p-value can be computed based on the exact binomial test. If we define the two-sided
posterior probability,
PoP2 = 2[1−max{Pr(pE > p0|yE),Pr(pE < p0|yE)}],
then its relationship with p-value is similar to that of one-sided hypothesis testing as shown
in Figure 4.
In a numerical study, we set n = 20, 50, 100 and 500, p0 = 0.2, and randomly draw
integers between 0 and n to be the values of yE. We assume a noninformative prior for pE ,
i.e., aE = 1 and bE = 1. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the posterior probability
of the null hypothesis Pr(H0|yE) and the p-value, which clearly indicates that all the points
lie very close to the straight line of y = x.
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4 Hypothesis Test for Normal Data
4.1 Hypothesis Test with Known Variance
In a two-arm randomized clinical trial with normal endpoints, we are interested in comparing
the means of the outcomes between the experimental and standard arms. Let n denote the
sample size for each arm, and let D = {(yE1, yS1), . . . , (yEn, ySn)} denote the paired data un-
der the experimental and standard treatments. Assume yEi ∼ N(µE , σ
2) and ySi ∼ N(µS, σ
2)
with unknown means µE and µS but a known variance σ
2 = 1. Let y¯E =
∑n
i=1 yEi/n and
y¯S =
∑n
i=1 ySi/n denote the sample means, and let θ = µE − µS and θˆ = y¯E − y¯S denote the
true and the observed treatment difference, respectively.
Considering the one-sided hypothesis test,
H0: θ ≤ 0 versus H1: θ > 0,
the frequentist Z-test statistic is formulated as θˆ/
√
2/n, which follows the standard normal
distribution under the null hypothesis. Therefore, the p-value under the one-sided hypothesis
test is given by
p-value1 = Pr(Z ≥ θˆ
√
n/2|H0) = 1− Φ(θˆ
√
n/2),
where Z denotes the standard normal random variable.
In the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume an improper flat prior distribution, p(θ) ∝ 1, the
posterior distribution of θ is
θ|D ∼ N(θˆ, 2/n).
Therefore, the posterior probability of θ smaller or equal to 0 is
PoP1 = Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) = 1− Φ(θˆ
√
n/2).
Under such an improper prior distribution of θ, we can establish an exact equivalence rela-
tionship between p-value and Pr(θ ≤ 0|D).
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Under the two-sided hypothesis test, H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ 6= 0, the p-value is given
by
p-value2 = 2[1−max{Pr(Z ≥ z|H0),Pr(Z ≤ z|H0)}]
= 2− 2max{Φ(θˆ
√
n/2),Φ(−θˆ
√
n/2)}.
Correspondingly, the two-sided posterior probability is defined as
PoP2 = 2[1−max{Pr(θ < 0|D),Pr(θ > 0|D)}]
= 2− 2max{Φ(θˆ
√
n/2),Φ(−θˆ
√
n/2)},
which is exactly the same as the (two-sided) p-value.
4.2 Hypothesis Test with Unknown Variance
In a more general setting, we consider the case where µE, µS and σ are all unknown parame-
ters. We define xi = yEi−ySi, which follows the normal distribution N(θ, 2σ
2). For notational
simplicity, let ν = 2σ2 and we are interested in modeling the joint posterior distribution of
θ and ν.
In the frequentist paradigm, Student’s t-test statistic is
T =
θˆ√∑n
i=1(xi − θˆ)
2/{(n− 1)n}
.
Therefore, the p-value under the one-sided hypothesis test is
p-value1 = 1− Ftn−1(T ),
where Ftn−1(·) denotes the CDF of Student’s t distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom.
In the Bayesian paradigm, if we assume Jeffreys’ prior for θ and ν, p(θ, ν) ∝ ν−3/2, the
corresponding posterior distribution is
p(θ, ν|D) ∝ ν−(n+3)/2 exp
{
−
∑n
i=1(xi − θˆ)
2 + n(θˆ − θ)2
2ν
}
,
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which matches the normal-inverse-chi-square distribution,
(θ, ν)|D ∼ N–Inv χ2
(
θˆ, n, n,
n∑
i=1
(xi − θˆ)
2/n
)
.
Based on the posterior distribution, the one-sided posterior probability of the null hypothesis
is PoP1 = Pr(θ ≤ 0|D).
As an alternative to Jeffreys’ prior distribution, we also consider a normal-inverse-gamma
prior distribution for θ and ν, (θ, ν) ∼ N–IG(θ0, ν0, α, β), which belongs to the conjugate
family of prior distributions for the normal likelihood function. As a result, the corresponding
posterior distribution is also a normal-inverse-gamma prior distribution,
(θ, ν)|D ∼ N–IG
(
θ0ν0 + nθˆ
ν0 + n
, ν0 + n, α +
n
2
, β +
1
2
n∑
i=1
(xi − θˆ)
2 +
nν0
ν0 + n
(θˆ − θ0)
2
2
)
.
For a two-sided hypothesis test, the p-value is
p-value2 = 2− 2Ftn−1(|T |)
= 2[1−max{Ftn−1(T ), Ftn−1(−T )}].
Similarly, we define the two-sided posterior probability as
PoP2 = 2[1−max{Pr(θ > 0|D),Pr(θ < 0|D)}].
In a numerical study, we simulate a large number of trials, and for each replication we
compute the posterior probability Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) and p-value. To ensure that the simulated p-
values can cover the entire range of (0, 1), we generate values of θ from N(0, 0.05) and ν from
N(1, 0.05) truncated at zero. To construct a vague normal-inverse-gamma prior distribution,
we take θ0 = 0, ν0 = 100, and α = β = 0.01. Under Jeffreys’ prior and the vague normal-
inverse-gamma prior distributions, the equivalence relationships between p-values and the
posterior probabilities Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) are shown in Figure 5, with sample size of 20, 50 and
100, respectively.
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In addition, we generate values of xi from a Gamma(2, 0.5) distribution, a Beta(0.5, 0.5)
distribution, as well as a mixture of normal distributions of N(−1, 1) and N(1, 1) with equal
weights. To ensure that the simulated p-values can cover the entire range of (0, 1), the sim-
ulated values of xi are further deducted by the mean value of the corresponding distribution
plus a uniform random variable. Under Jeffreys’ prior, the equivalence relationships between
p-values and the posterior probabilities Pr(θ ≤ 0|D) are shown in Figure 6.
To study the effect of informative prior and sample size on the relationship between p-
values and the posterior probabilities, we construct an informative prior distribution on θ
by setting θ0 = θ + 0.01, ν0 = 0.01, and α = β = 0.01. Under such an informative prior
distribution, the relationships between p-values and the posterior probabilities Pr(θ ≤ 0|D)
under increasing sample sizes are shown in Figure 7. As sample size increases, the equivalence
relationship is gradually established. Moreover, we consider the case where the sample size
is fixed but the prior variance increases, i.e., we take θ0 = θ + 0.01 and let ν0 change from
0.001 to 1. As shown in Figure 7, as the prior distribution becomes less informative, the
equivalence relationship becomes more evident.
5 Hypothesis Test for Multivariate Normal Data
In hypothesis testing on the mean vector of a multivariate normal random variable, we
consider X ∼ Np(µ,Σ), where p is the dimension of the multivariate normal distribution.
For the ease of exposition, the covariance matrix Σ is assumed to be known. Let D =
{X1, . . . ,Xn} denote the observed multivariate vectors, let X¯ =
∑n
i=1Xi/n denote the
sample mean vector, and thus X¯ ∼ Np(µ,Σ/n).
Consider the one-sided hypothesis test,
H0: c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K versus H1: c
⊤
k µ > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K,
where c1, . . . , cK areK prespecified p-dimensional vectors. The likelihood ratio test statistics
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(Sasabuchi, 1980) are
Zk =
c⊤k X¯√
c⊤kΣck/n
, k = 1, . . . , K, (5.1)
and the corresponding p-values are
p-value(k)1 = 1− Φ(Zk).
The null hypothesis is rejected if all of the K p-values are smaller than α.
In the Bayesian paradigm, we assume a conjugate multivariate normal prior distribution
for µ, µ ∼ Np(µ0,Σ0). The corresponding posterior distribution is µ|D ∼ Np(µn,Σn),
where
µn = Σ0
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
X¯+
1
n
Σ
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
µ0,
Σn =
1
n
Σ
(
Σ0 +
Σ
n
)−1
Σ.
The one-sided posterior probability corresponding to ck is
PoP(k)1 = Pr(c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0|D).
For two-sided hypothesis testing (Liu and Berger, 1995), we are interested in
H0: c
⊤
k µ ≤ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K, and
c⊤k µ ≥ 0 for some k = 1, . . . , K
versus
H1: c
⊤
k µ > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K, or
c⊤k µ < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Based on (5.1), the p-values are given by
p-value(k)2 = 2− 2Φ(|Zk|) = 2[1−max{Φ(Zk),Φ(−Zk)}].
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The null hypothesis is rejected if all of the K p-values are smaller than α. Similar to the
univariate case, we define the two-sided posterior probability,
PoP(k)2 = 2[1−max{Pr(c
⊤
k µ > 0|D),Pr(c
⊤
k µ < 0|D)}].
In a numerical study, we compute the posterior probabilities of c⊤k µ ≤ 0 for k = 1, . . . , K,
and compare them with the corresponding p-values. We takeK = 2 and ck to be a unit vector
with 1 on the kth element and 0 otherwise, and assume a vague normal prior distribution
for µ, i.e., µ0 = 0 and Σ0 = 1000Ip, where Ip is a p-dimensional identity matrix. The
relationship between the posterior probabilities and p-values is shown in Figure 8, which is
very similar to that in the univariate setting, which again demonstrates their equivalence.
6 Discussion
Berger and Sellke (1987) studied the point null for two-sided hypothesis tests, and noted
discrepancies between the frequentist test and the Bayesian test based on the posterior
probability. The major difference between their work and the equivalence relationship be-
tween the posterior probability and p-value established here lies in the assumption of the
prior distribution. Berger and Sellke (1987) assumed a point mass prior distribution at the
point null hypothesis, which violates the regularity condition of continuity in Dudley and
Haughton (2002), leading to the discrepancy between the posterior probability and p-value.
The equivalence relationship between the posterior probability and p-value for one-sided
tests can be established from the theoretical results of Dudley and Haughton (2002), where
the posterior probability of a half space is proven to converge to the standard normal CDF
transformation of the likelihood ratio test statistic. A future direction of research is on more
complex composite hypotheses tests involving multivariate normal outcomes. Berger (1989)
and Liu and Berger (1995) constructed a uniformly more powerful test than the likelihood
ratio test for multivariate one-sided tests involving linear inequalities. Follman (1996) pro-
17
posed a simple alternative to the likelihood ratio test. It would be of interest to study the
relationship of these tests with the Bayesian counterparts based on posterior probabilities.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the type I error rate and power under the frequentist Z-test and
Bayesian test based on the posterior probability for detecting treatment difference δ = 0.15
(left) and δ = 0.1 (right).
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Figure 2: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under one-sided one-sample and two-sample hypothesis tests with binary outcomes
under sample sizes of 20, 50, 100 and 500 per arm, respectively.
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Figure 3: The differences between p-values and posterior probabilities over 1000 replications
in one-sided two-sample hypothesis tests with binary outcomes under sample sizes of 20, 50,
100 and 500, respectively.
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Figure 4: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under two-sided one-sample and two-sample hypothesis tests with binary outcomes
under sample size of 500 per arm.
27
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 20
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 50
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 100
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 20
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 50
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, Jeffreys’ prior, n = 100
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 20
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 50
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
One−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 100
Pr( µE ≤ µS |D)
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 20
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 50
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Two−sided test, N−IG prior, n = 100
2−2max{ Pr( µE < µS |D) ,Pr( µE > µS |D)}
p−
va
lu
e
Figure 5: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under one-sided and two-sided hypothesis tests with normal outcomes assuming
Jeffreys’ prior and vague normal-inverse-gamma prior under sample size of 20, 50 and 100,
respectively.
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Figure 6: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under one-sided hypothesis tests with outcomes generated from Gamma, Beta and
mixture normal distributions, assuming Jeffreys’ prior for the normal distribution under
sample size of 20 and 50, respectively.
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Figure 7: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability Pr(µE ≤ µS|D)
over 1000 replications under one-sided hypothesis tests with normal outcomes; left panel:
assuming a fixed informative normal-inverse-gamma prior under increasing sample sizes of
1000, 10000 and 100000 (from top to bottom), right panel: assuming a fixed sample size of
1000 with an increasing prior variance of 0.001, 0.01 and 1 (from top to bottom).
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Figure 8: The relationship between p-value and the posterior probability over 1000 repli-
cations under one-sided and two-sided hypothesis tests with multivariate normal outcomes
under sample size of 100.
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